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I. INTRODUCTION 
John Boehner, the Republican former Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, and Ed Rendell, the former Chair of the Democratic National 
Committee and Governor of Pennsylvania, have something unusual in common: 
Each has publicly announced that he is part of an ongoing conspiracy to violate 
federal drug laws. It feels more than a little strange to write that. But it is true. 
In April 2018, Boehner joined the advisory board of Acreage Holdings,1 which 
bills itself as having “the most diverse portfolio of any company in the American 
cannabis industry, with cultivation, processing and dispensing operations across 
14 states with plans to expand.”2 Even more daringly, in October 2018, Ed 
Rendell incorporated a nonprofit organization called Safehouse in order to open 
the first safe injection site in the United States; a safe injection site is a place 
where people can self-administer drugs in a controlled environment under 
medical supervision.3  
That two prominent established political figures would so openly flout 
federal drug laws is indicative of a broader shift in thinking about the status of 
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 1 Daniel Victor, John Boehner’s Marijuana Reversal: ‘My Thinking on Cannabis Has 
Evolved,’ N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/us/politic
s/boehner-cannabis-marijuana.html [https://perma.cc/5SMF-XD6Z]. 
 2 John Hageman, Fargo, Bismarck Locations Among First ND Medical Marijuana 
Dispensaries Selected, W. FARGO PIONEER (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.west 
fargopioneer.com/news/4503567-fargo-bismarck-locations-among-first-nd-medical-
marijuana [https://perma.cc/RZJ2-ZF3E]. 
 3 Bobby Allyn, Former Gov. Ed Rendell Says ‘Arrest Me First’ for Backing Supervised 
Injection Facility, WHYY (Oct. 2, 2018), https://whyy.org/articles/former-gov-ed-
rendell-says-arrest-me-first-for-backing-safe-injection-facility/ [https://perma.cc/6D 
WL-B9MC].  
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the war on drugs. For decades, the drug war enjoyed nearly universal support 
from elected officials from across the political spectrum and being seen as “soft” 
on drugs or crime was considered to be “one of the surest career-killers in 
American politics.”4 Recently, however, voicing opposition to the drug war has 
become fashionable. Politicians who have called the drug war a failure include 
conservatives like former New Jersey Governor Chris Christie and Kentucky 
Senator Rand Paul and progressives like New Jersey Senator Cory Booker and 
California Governor Gavin Newsom.5 Similarly, both of President Barack 
Obama’s “drug czars” said they thought it was time to end the war on drugs in 
favor of a different strategy.6  
In an article published three years ago in this journal, I argued that these 
developments were signs of an emerging political consensus against the war on 
drugs.7 Since then, the effort to end the drug war has continued to gain 
momentum in some quarters. But there has also been a backlash as the Trump 
administration has sought to revive the drug war. Former Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions, whose harsh views on drugs are well-known,8 rescinded Obama-era 
Department of Justice policies that had limited the use of mandatory minimum 
penalties in lower-level drug cases.9 Former Deputy Attorney General Rod 
Rosenstein lamented the fact that federal drug prosecutions and sentences both 
decreased during the Obama administration and pledged to “work[] to reverse 
those trends.”10 
With some leaders calling for an end to the drug war and others proposing 
to double down on it, U.S. drug policy appears to be at a crossroads. There is 
perhaps no better example of this dynamic than our response to the opioid 
epidemic, the topic of this symposium. On the one hand, policymakers have 
implemented a number of modest harm reduction-oriented policies, including 
some that would have been unthinkable at the height of the war on drugs. Forty 
states and the District of Columbia have passed “Good Samaritan” laws, which 
give people who call 911 to report a drug overdose immunity from prosecution 
 
 4 JIM WEBB, A TIME TO FIGHT: RECLAIMING A FAIR AND JUST AMERICA 216 (2008); see 
also Alex Kreit, Drug Truce, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1323, 1323 (2016). 
 5 See Kreit, supra note 4, at 1325–26 (discussing opposition to the drug war among 
well-known elected officials). 
 6 Id. at 1324. 
 7 Id. at 1325. 
 8 Sheldon Whitehouse, Foreword, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 359, 373 (2017) (noting 
that before he became Attorney General, “Sessions spent years as one of the most vocal 
obstacles to criminal justice reform in Congress”). 
 9 Alan Vinegrad, Commentary: DOJ Charging and Sentencing Policies: From 
Civiletti to Sessions, 30 FED. SENT’G REP. 3 (2017) (discussing this development). 
 10 Rod J. Rosenstein, Fight Drug Abuse, Don’t Subsidize It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/27/opinion/opioids-heroin-injection-sites 
.html [https://perma.cc/9KW7-F5Z8]. 
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for specified crimes like drug possession.11 Approximately thirty different cities 
and counties have established Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion (LEAD) 
programs, which send some drug arrestees to treatment without criminal charges 
ever being filed.12 With some support from the federal government, states have 
also enacted a range of laws to expand access to the anti-overdose drug 
naloxone.13 On the other hand, since 2011 at least thirteen states have enacted 
new drug war-style mandatory minimum penalties for opioid offenses.14 As 
already noted, the federal government has resumed seeking mandatory 
minimum penalties against lower-level drug offenders as part of what the Trump 
administration has referred to as a “war” on opioids.15 Trump has even proposed 
the death penalty for “drug dealers” and disturbingly praised Rodrigo Duterte, 
President of the Philippines, for carrying out a drug war in which there have 
been thousands of extrajudicial killings of suspected drug sellers and users.16 
This Article considers the state of the war on drugs through the lens of the 
opioid crisis. I focus on two responses to the opioid epidemic—the pursuit of 
safe injection sites and the increase in drug-induced homicide prosecutions—
that exemplify two divergent approaches: ending the drug war or doubling down 
on it. The Article proceeds in four parts. Parts I and II describe current efforts 
to establish safe injection sites and the recent surge in drug-induced homicide 
prosecutions, respectively, and situate both in the context of the war on drugs. 
In Part III, I argue that these two examples help to shed light on why turning 
enthusiasm for ending the drug war into concrete reform has been so 
challenging. In both cases, drug war supporters have been able to use long-
dormant laws that were passed at the height of the drug war to frustrate reform 
efforts. Ending the drug war requires significant legislative change; reviving can 
be easily done with drug war-era laws that are already in place. Part IV 
concludes.  
 
 11 Drug Overdose Immunity and Good Samaritan Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (June 5, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/ 
drug-overdose-immunity-good-samaritan-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/7YD5-UYEC]. 
 12 Barbara Fedders, Opioid Policing, 94 IND. L.J. 389, 430–33 (2019) (discussing Law 
Enforcement Assisted Diversion programs). 
 13 Christopher T. Creech, Comment, Increasing Access to Naloxone: Administrative 
Solutions to the Opioid Overdose Crisis, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 517, 524–25 (2016). 
 14 See Andrew M. Parker et al., State Responses to the Opioid Crisis, 46 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 367, 373 (2018). 
 15 How We Will Win the War on Opioids, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 1, 2018), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/will-win-war-opioids/ [https://perma.cc/3KKT-
NLPX]. 
 16 Maya Rhodan, President Trump Is Officially Proposing That We Give Drug 
Traffickers the Death Penalty, TIME (Mar. 19, 2018), http://time.com/5205467/ 
donald-trump-death-penalty-drug-traffickers-opioid/ [https://perma.cc/Q3DS-FPXV] 
(reporting that Trump told Duterte in a phone call that he had done an “unbelievable job” 
combatting the “drug problem” in the Philippines); see also Philippines: Events of 2018, 
HUM. RIGHTS WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/ 
philippines [https://perma.cc/ZS4C-3N7L]. 
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II. SAFE INJECTION SITES 
Second to state cannabis legalization laws, there is perhaps no better 
example of the political shift away from the war on drugs than efforts to 
establish safe injection sites in response to the opioid crisis.17 Safe injection sites 
are grounded in the principle of harm reduction.18 Harm reduction policies are 
not primarily concerned with reducing drug use.19 Instead, the strategy is to 
reduce the negative consequences associated with drug use.20 Consistent with 
this approach, safe injection sites (also sometimes called supervised injection 
facilities or safe consumption rooms, among other terms)21 aim “to reduce 
morbidity and mortality by providing a safe environment for more hygienic 
use . . . [and] to reduce drug use in public and improve public amenity in areas 
surrounding urban drug markets.”22 They do this by providing a space for people 
to use drugs they have purchased elsewhere in a safe environment, with clean 
syringes, and with medical professionals on hand.23 Many safe injection sites 
also provide other services to clients, including counseling, educational 
programming about communicable disease prevention, and referrals to health 
and social services programs.24  
Safe injection sites have been operating in other countries for decades. The 
first sanctioned facility opened in 1986 in Berne, Switzerland.25 Today, there 
are approximately 100 supervised injection sites in ten different countries, 
including Canada.26 Although there is some disagreement about the overall 
strength of the empirical evidence in support of safe injection sites, the studies 
to date have been overwhelmingly positive. A 2014 systemic review of the 
literature on safe injection sites examined seventy-five studies and concluded 
that injection sites “have largely fulfilled their initial objectives without 
enhancing drug use or drug trafficking.”27 Specifically, the literature review 
 
 17 This Part draws heavily from my discussion of safe injection sites in Alex Kreit, Safe 
Injection Sites and the Federal “Crack House” Statute, 60 B.C. L. REV. 415, 420–28 (2019). 
 18 Id. at 420. 
 19 Id.  
 20 Id. 
 21 Alex H. Kral & Peter J. Davidson, Addressing the Nation’s Opioid Epidemic: 
Lessons from an Unsanctioned Supervised Injection Site in the U.S., 53 AM. J. 
PREVENTATIVE MED. 919, 919 (2017).  
 22 EUR. MONITORING CTR. FOR DRUGS AND DRUG ADDICTION, DRUG CONSUMPTION 
ROOMS: AN OVERVIEW OF PROVISION AND EVIDENCE 2 (2018), http://www.emc 
dda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/2734/POD_Drug%20consumption%20rooms
.pdf [https://perma.cc/57FT-AT2K]. 
 23 Kral & Davidson, supra note 21, at 919 (providing an overview of safe injection 
sites). 
 24 Kreit, supra note 17, at 422 n.42. 
 25 EUR. MONITORING CTR. FOR DRUGS AND DRUG ADDICTION, supra note 22, at 2.  
 26 Kral & Davidson, supra note 21, at 919. 
 27 Chloé Potier et al., Supervised Injection Services: What Has Been Demonstrated? A 
Systematic Literature Review, 145 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 48, 48 (2014). 
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found that the evidence suggests safe injection sites improve public health 
outcomes for drug users by reducing overdose deaths and increasing access to 
health care while also improving public safety outcomes for the community by 
reducing public drug use and the prevalence of dropped syringes in public 
places.28 Further, the literature review found no evidence that safe injection sites 
increase drug use, which is the primary argument made by safe injection site 
opponents.29 These results should not be terribly surprising, particularly with 
respect to reductions in overdose deaths. The opioid-receptor antagonist drug 
naloxone is very effective at reversing overdoses if it is administered relatively 
soon after the onset of symptoms.30 And, of course, medical professionals are 
able to respond much more quickly to an overdose that occurs at a safe injection 
site than to one that occurs elsewhere. 
Despite the evidence in support of safe injection sites, they were long 
considered to be political nonstarters in the United States because they were 
seen as incompatible with the war on drugs. The war on drugs has been 
organized around the principle of use reduction in general and an idealized 
vision of a “drug free society” in particular.31 The drug war’s concern with “the 
consumption of the prohibited substance rather than any secondary 
consequences that might ensue”32 is in tension with harm reduction measures 
like safe injection sites. And at the height of the drug war, opposition to harm 
reduction proposals went beyond a difference of opinion about balancing public 
policy goals. The war on drugs was framed as a life and death struggle in which, 
as President Reagan’s Attorney General Edwin Meese put it, “there are no 
neutrals.”33 Regardless of the costs and benefits, safe injection sites and similar 
measures were considered to be unacceptable simply because they were a form 
of surrender.34 Indeed, proponents of harm reduction proposals were themselves 
 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 65. A 2018 review of the evidence by the RAND Corporation likewise found 
existing studies to be encouraging but struck a more cautious tone than the 2014 literature 
review. See BEAU KILMER ET AL., CONSIDERING HEROIN-ASSISTED TREATMENT AND 
SUPERVISED DRUG CONSUMPTION SITES IN THE UNITED STATES, RAND CORP. vi–xiii (2018), 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2600/RR2693/RA
ND_RR2693.pdf [https://perma.cc/LX3F-X3P5]. The RAND report found studies show 
that drug consumption that occurs at a safe injection site is less harmful, with a reduced risk 
of disease transmission. Id. at xi. But, the authors cautioned, that “[o]verall, the scientific 
evidence about the effectiveness of [supervised consumption sites] is limited in quality and 
the number of locations evaluated.” Id. at x. 
 30 See Edward W. Boyer, Management of Opioid Analgesic Overdose, 367 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 146, 149–51 (2012) (discussing the use of naloxone to treat overdoses). 
 31 Kreit, supra note 4, at 1336. 
 32 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SEARCH FOR RATIONAL DRUG 
CONTROL 9 (1992). 
 33 DAN BAUM, SMOKE AND MIRRORS: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND THE POLITICS OF 
FAILURE 214 (1996). 
 34 William J. Bennett, The Drug War Worked Once. It Can Again., WALL ST. J. (May 
15, 2001), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB989884118310019941 [https://perma.cc/ 
Y6ZD-PSNJ]; see Editorial Staff, The Controversial Debate on Supervised Injection 
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seen as possible enemies in the war on drugs; President George H.W. Bush 
famously described the enemy as “[e]veryone who uses drugs. Everyone who 
sells drugs. And everyone who looks the other way.”35 
For decades, the drug war enjoyed nearly universal support among 
politicians. In this environment, safe injection sites were unable to gain traction 
even in politically progressive cities like San Francisco. In 2007, for example, 
drug policy reform advocates held a symposium on Vancouver’s safe injection 
site that was co-sponsored by San Francisco’s health department in an attempt 
to get the issue on the local political agenda.36 The conference was promoted as 
an event to help city officials “figure out whether this is a way to reduce the 
harms and improve the health of our community.”37 As might have been 
expected, federal officials came out strongly against the idea. In response to the 
conference, an Office of National Drug Control Policy representative described 
safe injection sites as “a form of giving up” and said it was “disconcerting” that 
San Francisco would even consider them.38 But opposition at the time was not 
limited to the federal government. Even then-San Francisco Mayor Gavin 
Newsom, known for taking bold political stances on other progressive issues 
like marriage equality and marijuana legalization, declined to back the effort to 
study safe injection sites.39 As a result, the initiative “just kind of crashed and 
burned,” according to one of its backers.40 
A little over ten years later, the picture is decidedly different. “There are at 
least thirteen efforts underway in U.S. cities and states to start an official 
 
Facilities, LAGUNA TREATMENT HOSP., https://lagunatreatment.com/supervised-
injection-facilities/ [https://perma.cc/L5N3-F4X2] (last updated Sept. 20, 2019); see also 
Jonathan P. Caulkins & Peter Reuter, Dealing More Effectively and Humanely with Illegal 
Drugs, 46 CRIME & JUST. 95, 117 (2017) (“In the United States ‘harm reduction’ became a 
toxic term, seen within law enforcement circles as a Trojan horse for legalization. . . .”). 
 35 BAUM, supra note 33, at 289 (quoting President George H.W. Bush). In this vein, 
former drug czar William J. Bennett once described state ballot measures to decrease 
penalties for marijuana possession as “the drug legalization movement’s advance on [the] 
home fronts” of those states. William J. Bennett, Don’t Put Up with Pot, Ohio, CIN. POST, 
Nov. 2, 2002, at A14. 
 36 Lisa Leff, San Francisco Considers Safe-Injection Site for Drug Addicts, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 18, 2007), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/2007-
10-18-sf-injections_N.htm [https://perma.cc/3EBM-LFSK]. 
 37 Id.  
 38 Id. 
 39 See C.W. Nevius, Support for Supervised Injection is Growing, SFGATE (Oct. 15, 
2007), https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/C-W-Nevius-Support-for-supervised-
drug-2518428.php [https://perma.cc/PC67-XQGG] (“Asked for a comment from Mayor 
Gavin Newsom, spokesman Nathan Ballard said, ‘The mayor is not inclined to support this 
approach, which quite frankly may end up creating more problems than it addresses.’”).  
 40 Beth Schwartzapfel, Is America Ready for Safe Injection Rooms?, VICE (Nov. 6, 
2015), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/4wb5yb/is-america-ready-for-safe-inject 
ion-rooms-1106 [https://perma.cc/25SV-XPA3]. 
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supervised injection site.”41 In four cities—New York, Philadelphia, San 
Francisco, and Seattle—officials have formally announced plans to open a safe 
injection site.42 Among this group, San Francisco and Philadelphia have 
arguably gone furthest. In February 2018, San Francisco’s Department of Public 
Health revealed that the city hoped to open two facilities in July 2018.43 
Although officials backed away from that plan, in late August 2018, they opened 
a nonoperational prototype safe injection site44 and Mayor London Breed has 
consistently reiterated her intent to open a functioning injection site in the near 
future.45 Efforts in Philadelphia have advanced even further. In January 2018, 
Philadelphia outlined a plan to find a nonprofit organization to open a safe 
injection site in the city.46 For months, it seemed like the initiative was going 
nowhere. But, as noted in the introduction to this Article, former Pennsylvania 
Governor and Philadelphia Mayor Ed Rendell incorporated a nonprofit called 
Safehouse in October 2018 to open and operate the planned safe injection site.47 
Safehouse began to work toward its goal until it was sued by the United States 
Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in February 2019.48  
 
 41 Bobby Allyn, Cities Planning Supervised Drug Injection Sites Fear Justice 
Department Reaction, NPR (July 12, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/ 
2018/07/12/628136694/harm-reduction-movement-hits-obstacles [https://perma.cc/ 
DM8R-QVWT]. 
 42 See Kreit, supra note 17, at 427 (providing an overview of current efforts to establish 
safe injection sites in the United States). Denver officials abandoned their effort in early 
2019—at least, temporarily—after failing to gain support for their effort at the state level. 
Anna Staver, Colorado Lawmakers Won’t Vote on Safe Injection Sites in 2019. House 
Democratic Leader Blames Denver, DENV. POST (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.denver 
post.com/2019/02/19/safe-injection-sites-denver-colorado/ [https://perma.cc/4N7U-
RU8F]. 
 43 Heather Knight, SF Safe Injection Sites Expected to Be First in Nation, Open Around 
July 1, S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/news/article/SF-safe-
injection-sites-expected-to-be-first-in-12553616.php [https://perma.cc/XA9T-FN5B]. 
 44 Laura Waxmann, Mock Safe Injection Site Opens in SF Amid Threat of Federal 
Prosecution, S.F. EXAMINER (Aug. 30, 2018), http://www.sfexaminer.com/mock- 
safe-injection-site-opens-sf-amid-threat-federal-prosecution/ [https://perma.cc/HP7G 
-BSS6]. San Francisco’s effort has gained support from some state lawmakers, who 
introduced a bill in early 2019 to allow the sites under state law. Dominic Fracassa, 
California Bill Allowing San Francisco Safe Injection Site Reintroduced, S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 
4, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/California-bill-allowing-San-
Francisco-safe-13589277.php [https://perma.cc/M5CL-WAS6]. 
 45 See Heather Knight, Breed Says Fight for Safe Injection Sites in SF Isn’t Over, S.F. 
CHRON. (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/heatherknight/article/ 
Breed-says-fight-for-safe-injection-sites-in-SF-13273455.php [https://perma.cc/7N 
WG-MK2M].  
 46 Elana Gordon, What’s Next for ‘Safe Injection’ Sites in Philadelphia?, NPR (Jan. 24, 
2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/01/24/580255140/whats-next-
for-safe-injection-sites-in-philadelphia [https://perma.cc/39CM-6KQD]. 
 47 Allyn, supra note 3. 
 48 Bobby Allyn, U.S. Prosecutors Sue to Stop Nation’s First Supervised Injection Site 
for Opioids, NPR (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/ 
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As a result of federal opposition, which is discussed more below in Part III, 
efforts to open a facility have not yet moved past the planning stages. But the 
fact that safe injection sites are receiving serious consideration from so many 
state and local lawmakers says a great deal about the state of the war on drugs. 
In just over a decade, safe injection sites have gone from being politically off-
limits, even in San Francisco, to a mainstream policy issue in a number of cities 
and states. Indeed, if not for federal opposition, safe injection sites would almost 
certainly be operating in one or more cities already. No doubt, the severity of 
the opioid crisis is what has prompted state and local lawmakers to consider safe 
injection sites. In addition, media coverage of the opioid epidemic that has 
tended to focus on “the white prescription opioid cum heroin user”49 has surely 
contributed to the way politicians have responded to the opioid crisis. But the 
fact that this particular policy option is generating so much interest is also a 
testament to the changed politics of the war on drugs. In previous drug 
epidemics—from the crack epidemic in the 1980s50 to the methamphetamine 
epidemic in the 2000s51—lawmakers almost uniformly responded with 
reactionary and punitive proposals. Over the past decade, the calls from 
politicians of all stripes to end to the drug war have changed the tenor of the 
discussion. This has created the political space for policy proposals like safe 
injection sites to be evaluated and debated on their merits, rather than being 
dismissed out-of-hand on ideological grounds.  
III. DRUG-INDUCED HOMICIDE PROSECUTIONS 
Although the opioid epidemic has seen U.S. policymakers embrace harm 
reduction-oriented policies in a way that would have been unthinkable a decade 
ago, there have also been signs of a backlash. At the federal level, the Trump 
administration’s interest in reviving the drug war has received a good deal of 
attention. But even before Trump took office, the war on drugs continued to 
 
02/06/691746907/u-s-prosecutors-sue-to-stop-nation-s-first-supervised-injection-site 
[https://perma.cc/6XN4-FYQT]. Safehouse countersued in April. Aubrey Whelan, 
Supervised Injection Site Supporters Countersue Feds, Saying Their Philly Mission Comes 
from Religious and Medical Imperatives, PHILA. INQUIRER (Apr. 3, 2019), 
https://www.inquirer.com/health/supervised-injection-site-religious-beliefs-safe 
house-lawsuit-philadelphia-20190403.html [https://perma.cc/866X-B29W]. 
 49 Julie Netherland & Helena B. Hansen, The War on Drugs That Wasn’t: Wasted 
Whiteness, “Dirty Doctors,” and Race in Media Coverage of Prescription Opioid Misuse, 
40 CULTURE MED. & PSYCHOL. 664, 664 (2016) (italics added). 
 50 See Mona Lynch & Marisa Omori, Crack as Proxy: Aggressive Federal Drug 
Prosecutions and the Production of Black-White Racial Inequality, 52 L. & SOC’Y REV. 773, 
774 (2018) (assessing the “racial legacy effects of the 1980s’ federal crack ‘war’”). 
 51 See Note, Cooking Up Solutions to a Cooked Up Menace: Responses to 
Methamphetamine in a Federal System, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2508, 2514–15 (2006) 
(discussing the focus of state legislators on “criminal penalties” in their efforts to respond to 
the methamphetamine epidemic); id. at 2518 (describing federal prosecutors as being “in the 
vanguard on aggressively sentencing those trafficking in methamphetamine”).  
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march along, if only due to inertia. By and large, drug laws and enforcement 
budgets have not changed very much since the height of the war on drugs.52 
Drug possession arrest rates have remained relatively steady, and sentences for 
drug trafficking offenses are still quite severe.53 This is a reflection of the fact 
that rhetoric in favor of ending the drug war has not yet translated into 
significant legislative reform; most changes have occurred at the margins of 
drug policy, not its foundation.54 The result is that “use of the criminal justice 
system continues to dominate local, state, and federal responses to increasing 
rates of opioid use and overdose.”55  
Indeed, in some respects, the war on drugs has intensified. The rise in drug-
induced homicide prosecutions provides an example. Under drug-induced 
homicide statutes, drug distribution that results in death is punished as a 
homicide offense. Twenty states and the federal Controlled Substances Act 
(CSA) have a drug-induced homicide law.56 Although the particulars of these 
laws vary, they generally make defendants strictly liable when death results 
from the distribution of a controlled substance.57 Most were passed at the height 
of the war on drugs, in the 1980s and 1990s.58 The federal law, for example, 
 
 52 Kreit, supra note 4, at 1324–25. 
 53 Drug arrests have declined slightly since their high point in the mid-2000s. During 
Obama’s last year in office in 2016, there were just over 1.57 million drug arrests, down 
from 1.7 million at the year he was elected. Tom Angell, Drug Arrests on the Rise in US: 
New FBI Data, FORBES (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
tomangell/2017/09/25/drug-arrests-on-the-rise-in-us-new-fbi-data/#26c49da87274 
[https://perma.cc/7VQH-BYFB]. Marijuana arrests appear to account for the lion’s share 
of the decrease, likely due to marijuana decriminalization and legalization laws. See Alex 
Kreit, Marijuana Legalization, 1 REFORMING CRIM. JUST. 115, 119 (Erik Luna ed., 2017). 
With regard to sentencing, almost all of the federal drug mandatory minimum penalties 
enacted in the 1980s remain in place and federal drug sentences have decreased only slightly 
in recent years. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N., MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES FOR 
DRUG OFFENSES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 11–15 (2017), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-
publications/2017/20171025_Drug-Mand-Min.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DJA-NCTJ]. In 
December 2018, Congress passed a notable sentencing reform bill, the FIRST STEP Act, 
which includes modest reductions to some mandatory minimum drug penalties. FIRST STEP 
Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 401, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018). For an overview of the 
FIRST STEP Act, see First Step Act: Signed into Law on December 21, 2018, ESP INSIDER 
EXPRESS (Feb. 2019), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/newsletters
/2019-special_FIRST-STEP-Act.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SWF-7YMP] [hereinafter First 
Step Act]. 
 54 See generally First Step Act, supra note 53 (summarizing legal changes pursuant to 
the First Step Act). 
 55 DRUG POLICY ALL., AN OVERDOSE DEATH IS NOT MURDER: WHY DRUG-INDUCED 
HOMICIDE LAWS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND INHUMAN 6 (2017), 
https://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/dpa_drug_induced_homicide_report_0
.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9GH-W9PH] [hereinafter DRUG POLICY ALL.].  
 56 See id. at 56–60 (summarizing existing drug-induced homicide statutes). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
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was passed in 1986 and provides for a twenty year mandatory minimum 
sentence “if death or serious bodily injury results from the use of”59 an illegally 
distributed drug. Although most of these laws have been on the books for 
decades, they were not frequently employed until recently.60 This has changed 
over the past few years as more police and prosecutors have come to see them 
as a tool for responding to the opioid crisis. Some police and prosecutors have 
adopted policies of treating every overdose death as a homicide scene.61 The 
DEA has worked to encourage this approach by offering trainings to patrol 
officers on investigating overdose death cases.62 Drug-induced homicide 
prosecutions have skyrocketed as a result. Although no database tracks these 
prosecutions, two recent studies based on news articles both concluded that 
there has been a dramatic increase in drug-induced homicide prosecutions over 
the past decade, with one of the studies finding a 300% spike between 2011 and 
2016.63 
To appreciate why this trend suggests a revival of the war on drugs, it is 
important to understand the broad reach of drug-induced homicide laws. First, 
drug-induced homicide laws are strict liability offenses that, many courts have 
held, also dispense with traditional proximate cause requirements.64 Because the 
government does not need to show that a defendant was reckless or even 
criminally negligent, the laws are not limited to sellers who are particularly 
culpable, such as a seller who distributes a substance claiming it to be cocaine 
while knowing that it is laced with fentanyl.65 With respect to causation, 
 
 59 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1986). 
 60 DRUG POLICY ALL., supra note 55, at 11 (“Though many drug-induced homicide 
laws have sat idly on the books since their enactment decades ago, prosecutors are now 
reinvigorating them with a rash of drug-induced homicide charges in the wake of increasing 
overdose deaths.”). 
 61 E.g., Justin Fenton, Baltimore Homicide Detectives to Begin Investigating Drug 
Overdoses, BALT. SUN (May 2, 2017), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/ 
maryland/crime/bs-md-ci-baltimore-police-investigate-overdoses-20170501-story 
.html [https://perma.cc/HD37-CEC6] (reporting that “[f]or the first time, Baltimore police 
have begun investigating overdoses in an effort to trace drugs back to dealers” via a task 
force of five detectives “operat[ing] out of the homicide unit”); see also Jeff Mordock, N.Y. 
Police Now Treat Drug Overdose Sites as Crime Scenes in Bid to Take Down Dealers, 
WASH. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/feb/19/  
new-york-opioid-overdose-sites-now-crime-scenes/ [https://perma.cc/K5GY-UCJH].  
 62 Fenton, supra note 61 (reporting that more than 1000 patrol officers had been trained 
by the DEA as of mid-2017). 
 63 DRUG POLICY ALL., supra note 55, at 2, 11–14; see also Leo Beletsky, America’s 
Favorite Antidote: Drug-Induced Homicide in the Age of the Overdose Crisis, 2019 UTAH 
L. REV. 833, 873 (finding “a sharp upward trend” in drug-induced homicide prosecutions 
beginning in 2009 that indicates a “spike in prosecutions”). 
 64 See DRUG POLICY ALL., supra note 55, at 9–10. 
 65 Cf. Annamarya Scaccia, How Fentanyl Is Contaminating America’s Cocaine Supply, 
ROLLING STONE (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-
features/fentanyl-cocaine-how-contamination-happens-735155/ [https://perma.cc/ 
WA9D-Z9UG]. 
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although the Supreme Court has held that the federal drug-induced homicide 
statute incorporates a but-for causation requirement,66 it left the question of 
whether the offense requires proof of proximate causation unresolved.67 Most 
circuit courts have held that the law does not include a foreseeability 
requirement, however.68 These courts have reasoned that the statute’s language 
is plain and “unambiguous and that giving effect to its plain meaning prohibits 
us from superimposing upon the statute a foreseeability or proximate cause 
requirement.”69 Although there are relatively few published opinions addressing 
whether the intervening cause doctrine—which holds that “the causal link 
between [a defendant’s] conduct and the victim’s death [is] severed when the 
victim exercised his own free will”70—applies to drug-induced death cases, the 
little case law on the question suggests it does not.71 In its absence, drug-induced 
homicide statutes might apply even where death resulted because a person took 
an unusually large amount of the drug or mixed the drug with other substances. 
One federal district court judge went so far as to write that “[s]uicide through 
heroin overdose meets the statute’s terms.”72 
Second, and perhaps even more significant, drug-induced homicide laws do 
not apply only to drug sellers but also to people who share drugs with friends or 
family members. This is because some state laws along with the federal 
Controlled Substances Act criminalize drug distribution, not drug sale.73 Courts 
have consistently held that “the social sharing of a small quantity of drugs, 
without consideration, constitutes the distribution of drugs.”74 This background 
 
 66 Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 888 (2014) (citation omitted). 
 67 Id. at 887 (noting that while the Court had also granted review on the question of 
foreseeability, “[w]e find it necessary to decide only” the question of actual causation). 
 68 See, e.g., United States v. Webb, 655 F.3d 1238, 1250–52 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations 
omitted). 
 69 United States v. McIntosh, 236 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 2001), aff’d, 332 F.3d 550 
(8th Cir. 2003). 
 70 Lewis v. State, 474 So. 2d 766, 771 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985). 
 71 See United States v. Rodriguez, 279 F.3d 947, 951 n.5 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 72 Zanuccoli v. United States, 459 F. Supp. 2d 109, 112 (D. Mass. 2006) (emphasis 
added). But see Rodriguez, 279 F.3d at 951 n.5, 952 (citation omitted) (observing that some 
circuits “have not addressed whether there is an intervening cause exception” to the federal 
drug-induced homicide statute and declining to decide the issue in light of the disposition of 
the case). 
 73 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2012); United States v. Swiderski, 548 F.2d 445, 449 (2d Cir. 
1977) (discussing drug laws). 
 74 United States v. Wallace, 532 F.3d 126, 128–29 (2d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted) 
(collecting cases). This rule is limited somewhat by the so-called “joint-user” defense, which 
has been recognized by a number of courts. This doctrine provides that when “two 
individuals simultaneously and jointly acquire possession of a drug for their own use, 
intending only to share it together, their only crime is personal drug abuse—simple joint 
possession, without any intent to distribute the drug further.” Swiderski, 548 F.2d at 450. The 
legal basis for this rule is that users who jointly acquire drugs to use with each other are in 
either constructive (or actual) possession of the drugs from the time of the purchase. Id. 
Because a person cannot distribute an item to someone who already possesses it, joint 
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principle of drug laws dramatically expands the reach of drug-induced homicide 
statutes, which typically apply to any drug trafficking offense that results in 
death, including distribution.  
Of course, prosecutors could use their discretion to only charge sellers with 
drug-induced homicide. Although some prosecutors presumably do just that, 
others have decided to apply drug-induced homicide laws as aggressively as 
possible.75 Indeed, the limited data available suggests that users who shared 
drugs with friends or family members make up a shockingly high percentage of 
drug-induced homicide defendants. In his recent study of drug-induced 
homicide prosecutions, Leo Beletsky found that half of the drug-induced 
homicide defendants in his data set “were not, in fact, ‘dealers’ in the traditional 
sense, but friends and partners to the deceased.”76 Similarly, journalists who 
reviewed drug-induced homicide prosecutions in Wisconsin in 2017 reported 
that nearly 90% of the 100 cases they reviewed involved “either low-level street 
dealers or friends and relatives of the person who overdosed.”77 Not 
infrequently, spouses find themselves the target of these prosecutions. Consider 
one representative case. Jennifer Marie Johnson was convicted of third-degree 
murder under Minnesota’s drug-induced homicide law after her husband 
overdosed in March 2013.78 Johnson had shared some of her prescribed liquid 
methadone with her husband, at his request, “to help him fall asleep. He then 
took more without asking her permission. When [her husband] started to have 
difficulty breathing, Jennifer yelled to her daughter to call 911, and tried to 
revive him while they waited for help.”79 Johnson’s husband died and Johnson 
was sentenced to six years in prison.80 
Even when drug-induced homicide laws are applied to drug sellers, they 
rarely ensnare higher-level operators. Because each link in the distribution chain 
makes it more difficult to prove even but-for causation, the typical drug-induced 
homicide investigation begins and ends with the person who distributed drugs 
to the end-user.81 This is almost never a high- or even mid-level drug trafficker 
but, instead, a street level seller who deals in relatively small quantities of 
drugs.82 These kinds of low-level sellers are exceedingly unlikely to have any 
control over whether the drugs are cut with fentanyl or other dangerous 
 
purchasers cannot be convicted of distributing drugs to each other. See id. (finding that joint 
users cannot distribute to each other and discussing the rationale as to why). 
 75 DRUG POLICY ALL., supra note 55, at 14. 
 76 Beletsky, supra note 63, at 873–74. 
 77 Jack Shuler, Overdose and Punishment, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 10, 2018), https://new 
republic.com/article/150465/prosecutors-reviving-reagan-era-drug-induced-homicide 
-laws [https://perma.cc/RVZ2-AKK9]. These findings mirrored a similar review of New 
Jersey drug-induced homicide prosecutions in the early 2000s, which found that 25 of the 32 
cases reviewed “involved friends of the person who overdosed.” Id. 
 78 DRUG POLICY ALL., supra note 55, at 28. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 42. 
 82 Id. 
2019] OPIOID CRISIS 899 
adulterants.83 Not infrequently, they are users themselves, selling drugs in order 
to get money to pay for their own supply.84 Thus, although some drug-induced 
homicide laws purport to be targeted at “‘entrepreneurial drug dealers who 
traffic in large amounts of illegal drugs for profit,’ rather than users who sell to 
support their habit,”85 the practical reality of drug markets in combination with 
the broad reach of the laws means that very few drug-induced homicide 
defendants fall into that category. Instead, most drug sellers who are prosecuted 
for drug-induced homicide are no different than any other low-level drug 
seller.86  
The surge in prosecuting friends, family members, and low-level sellers for 
homicide offenses as a result of an overdose embodies the drug war philosophy. 
A core feature of the drug war has been the widespread application of 
unforgiving criminal penalties that bear no relationship to blameworthiness or 
efficacy.87 War connotes an existential threat and so, in the war on drugs, drug 
crimes came to be thought of as offenses “of the highest order,”88 despite the 
fact that drug exchanges are consensual transactions. Lengthy and far-reaching 
mandatory minimum drug penalties were “viewed as a statement that society 
would no longer tolerate the illegal drug epidemic.”89 In order to “send a 
message,” punishment was “pegged at a level that the legislature considers 
appropriate for a highly culpable participant . . . [and j]ust punishment for lesser 
roles is inevitably precluded.”90 
Like the archetypical drug war policy of mandatory minimum penalties, 
drug-induced homicide statutes can impose severe punishments on low-level 
sellers and even on users who share drugs with friends or family members. This 
is because, in most states, legislators did not narrowly craft drug-induced 
homicide statutes to focus on their purported targets of higher-level drug 
traffickers or traffickers who knowingly sell drugs with dangerous adulterants.91 
Instead, just as with mandatory minimum penalties based on drug type and 
quantity, lawmakers appear to have entrusted the reach of the laws to 
 
 83 Id. at 17. 
 84 DRUG POLICY ALL., supra note 55, at 41 (discussing studies suggesting that a large 
percentage of people convicted of drug trafficking offenses also use drugs and observing that 
“[i]t is widely understood among experts who study drug markets that many sellers are 
suffering from a substance use disorder and are selling to support their own drug use”). 
 85 Shuler, supra note 77 (quoting Vermont’s legislative findings). 
 86 DRUG POLICY ALL., supra note 55, at 42. 
 87 See Kreit, supra note 4, at 1337–38. 
 88 People v. Profit, 183 Cal. App. 3d 849, 870 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
 89 William W. Wilkins, Jr. et al., Competing Sentencing Policies in a “War on Drugs” 
Era, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 305, 315 (1993). 
 90 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
199, 211 (1993). 
 91 See DRUG POLICY ALL., supra note 55, at 9, 59, 65, 67 n.49 (discussing the strict 
liability mens rea imposed in drug-induced homicide statutes). 
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prosecutorial discretion.92 And, as with the application of mandatory minimum 
penalties based on drug type and quantity, prosecutions all too often target the 
low-hanging fruit.93 Unless one subscribes to the view that—in the words of one 
prosecutor—”[e]ven if you’re an addict, once you cross that line and give it or 
sell it to someone, you become a dealer,”94 it is hard to escape the conclusion 
that the aggressive use of drug-induced homicide statutes divorces punishments 
from blameworthiness.  
Drug-induced homicide prosecutions are perhaps even harder to justify on 
utilitarian grounds. Like other drug war-era policies, they are meant to send a 
message for its own sake.95 In contrast to safe injection sites, there is no 
empirical evidence whatsoever demonstrating that drug-induced homicide 
prosecutions achieve their stated goals. Nor is there much reason to think these 
prosecutions will reduce drug trafficking in general or trafficking in drugs cut 
with dangerous adulterants in particular.96 If prosecutions were limited to sellers 
who knew they were selling adulterated drugs or to higher-level participants 
responsible for deciding what to cut the drugs with, they might incentivize 
sellers to take greater care to protect the health of their buyers. But, as discussed 
above, most cases involve low-level sellers and users who share with one 
another—groups that have little or no control over what is in their product. 
Tellingly, even some of the prosecutors who pursue these cases have said they 
do not believe they have any deterrent effect,97 let alone an effect sufficient to 
justify the cost of prosecuting the cases and imprisoning the defendants who are 
convicted. Worse, there is some reason to think that drug-induced homicide 
prosecutions might contribute to the overdose death problem by deterring 
people from calling 911 to report an overdose.98 Despite all of this, as with most 
 
 92 See Schulhofer, supra note 90, at 202 (noting that mandatory minimum drug 
penalties “in effect delegate to prosecutors the power to decide whether the statute is really 
a mandate to impose a minimum sentence or instead is only a source of discretion”). 
 93 See DRUG POLICY ALL., supra note 55, at 42. 
 94 John Keilman, Who Counts As a Drug Dealer? As Heroin Overdoses Soar, Drug-
Induced Homicide Laws Blurs Line Between Exploiter and Victim, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 10, 
2018), http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/ct-met-drug-induced-homicide-law-
heroin-overdose-20180807-story.html [https://perma.cc/3CS8-9444]. 
 95 Shuler, supra note 77 (quoting a prosecutor who said, following a drug-induced 
homicide conviction, that the case “sent a strong message that cavalier use of drugs in our 
community isn’t going to be tolerated”).  
 96 See Beletsky, supra note 63, at 875–77 (arguing that drug-induced homicide 
prosecutions are unlikely to have a deterrent effect on drug sales in general or especially 
risky drug sales in particular); see also DRUG POLICY ALL., supra note 55, at 39. 
 97 Rosa Goldensohn, They Shared Drugs. Someone Died. Does That Make Them 
Killers?, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/25/us/drug-
overdose-prosecution-crime.html [https://perma.cc/XX8Y-8YPE] (reporting a prosecutor 
answering “No” to the question “whether overdose prosecutions have had an impact on the 
street”). 
 98 DRUG POLICY ALL., supra note 55, at 40 (arguing that “rather than reduce fatalities, 
drug-induced homicide laws only result in additional overdose deaths due to people failing 
to summon medical help for overdoses out of fear of prosecution”). 
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drug war policies, drug-induced homicide prosecutions are pursued because 
they further a zero-tolerance ideology.99 There is no need to show that the policy 
is likely to produce tangible benefits or even to study the question. Regardless 
of the costs and benefits, the policy is considered to be worthwhile because it is 
a “tough” response to drugs. 
IV. THE DRUG WAR AT A CROSSROADS 
Efforts to establish safe injection sites and the increase in drug-induced 
homicide prosecutions represent two competing visions for how to respond to 
the opioid epidemic. They also help to provide some insight into one of the 
reasons why ending the war on drugs is much more easily said than done: the 
availability of rarely used but broadly written drug war-era laws. So long as they 
remain on the books, these long-dormant drug war-era statutes can quickly be 
put into action at any time. Because of this dynamic, prosecutors have been able 
to double down on the war on drugs by aggressively charging and prosecuting 
drug-induced homicide cases, and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has been 
able to single-handedly stymie local efforts to establish safe injection sites. In 
both cases, broadly written laws passed in the 1980s that were dormant or near 
dead—the “zombie laws” of the drug war100—are being employed in ways their 
drafters likely did not intend in order to breathe new life into the drug war.101  
Federal opposition to safe injection sites provides an especially striking 
example of the scope of drug war-era laws and their potential to prevent reform 
today. Four cities have announced plans to open safe injection sites but none 
have done so due at least in part to threats of federal prosecution.102 In 
Philadelphia, the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
preemptively sued the nonprofit Safehouse to block a safe injection site from 
opening.103 Although the DOJ has not taken a formal position on safe injection 
sites, the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s 
position does not appear to be an outlier. In an August 2018 New York Times 
editorial, then-Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein pledged to take “swift 
and aggressive action” against any city or state that opens a safe injection site.104 
What is especially striking about Rosenstein’s threats and the lawsuit against 
Safehouse is the legal basis for the federal government’s opposition to safe 
injection sites. Safe injection sites do not manufacture, distribute, or possess 
 
 99 Shuler, supra note 77 (citation omitted). 
 100 I thank Eve Hanan for suggesting this phrase. 
 101 See Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 
25 (2010) (discussing the moral panic surrounding crack cocaine in the context of the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986); see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2017 SOURCEBOOK OF 
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS S-41 tbl.17, S-104 tbl.33 (statistics showing how little this 
statute is used). 
 102 See Kreit, supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 103 Allyn, supra note 48. 
 104 Rosenstein, supra note 10. 
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illegal drugs and it is unlikely site operators could be considered accomplices to 
drug possession.105 One might naturally wonder, then, why it is that federal 
prosecutors have proclaimed safe injection sites to be illegal. After all, federal 
law does not make it a crime to provide health services to people who use illegal 
drugs.  
The argument that safe injection sites violate federal law is grounded in a 
rarely used statute passed at the height of the war on drugs, the so-called federal 
“crack house” law.106 That law makes it a crime to “manage or control any 
place, whether permanently or temporarily, either as an owner, lessee, agent, 
employee, occupant, or mortgagee, and knowingly and intentionally rent, lease, 
profit from, or make available for use, with or without compensation, the place 
for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a 
controlled substance.”107 Formally titled “[m]aintaining drug-involved 
premises,”108 the law is often referred to as the crack house statute because it 
was passed in response to concerns about “so-called ‘crack-houses’[] where 
‘crack’, [sic] cocaine and other drugs are manufactured and used.”109 It was 
passed near the height of the drug war and during the moral panic surrounding 
crack cocaine,110 as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.111  
The legislative history of the law makes clear that it was written with crack 
houses in mind. Both “the short title and the Congressional Record synopsis 
refer to manufacturing and crack houses.”112 The Senate summarized the new 
law as one “that ‘outlaws operation of houses or buildings, so-called ‘crack 
houses’[] where ‘crack’, [sic] cocaine and other drugs are manufactured and 
 
 105 Assuming arguendo that a safe injection facility facilitates the possession of a 
controlled substance, accomplice liability attaches only to those who act “with the intent of 
facilitating the offense’s commission.” Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 71 (2014). 
Safe injection site operators do not intend to help people possess drugs or to encourage drug 
use; their purpose is to provide medical services to injection drug users. See Scott Burris et 
al., Federalism, Policy Learning, and Local Innovation in Public Health: The Case of the 
Supervised Injection Facility, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1089, 1100, 1133 (2009) (“An [sic] SIF 
is providing a space for use of controlled substances not for its own sake or for profit, but in 
order to promote drug treatment, prevent disease, and avoid overdose mortality.”). 
 106 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 6–7, United States v. Safehouse, No. 2:19-
cv-00519-GAM (E.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.safehousephilly.org/sites/default/ 
files/attachments/2019-02/1-main.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2UA-3PP3] (alleging that 
Safehouse’s proposed safe injection site would violate the crack house statute).  
 107 21 U.S.C. § 856(a) (2012). 
 108 Id. 
 109 132 CONG. REC. 26,474 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1986) (excerpt of Senate Amendment 
No. 3034 to H.R. 5484). 
 110 See Luna & Cassell, supra note 101, at 25 (discussing the moral panic surrounding 
crack cocaine in the context of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986).  
 111 United States v. Sturmoski, 971 F.2d 452, 462 (10th Cir. 1992) (discussing the 
legislative history of the crack house statute). 
 112 United States v. Tamez, 941 F.2d 770, 773 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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used.’”113 Since drug manufacturing and possession were already federal 
crimes,114 the crack house statute seemed designed more to meet a political need 
than to fill a real gap in the law. Not surprisingly then, crack house statute 
prosecutions are exceedingly rare. In 2017, maintaining a drug-involved 
premises was the primary offense of conviction for just 24 of the 19,750 drug 
offenses that received federal sentences.115 Despite this, the text of the law can 
apply to individuals with only a tenuous connection to drugs. Courts have 
consistently held that the statute “only requires that a defendant has the purpose 
of maintaining property where drug use takes place, and not that the defendant 
intends the drug use to occur.”116 As a result, “a ‘defendant may be liable if he 
manages or controls a building that others use for an illicit purpose, and he either 
knows of the illegal activity or remains deliberately ignorant of it.’”117 Based 
on this interpretation, it seems likely that courts would find that the crack house 
statute applies to safe injection site operators since they would have knowledge 
their clients were coming to the facility for the purpose of using drugs.118 To be 
sure, the legal status of safe injection sites has not yet been tested in court; 
Safehouse is vigorously fighting the DOJ’s lawsuit against them.119 And, as I 
have argued elsewhere, there may be a legal avenue for cities or states to open 
government-run safe injection sites without federal interference.120  
Whichever side prevails in the looming conflict over the legal status of safe 
injection sites, however, it is striking that a drug war-era law that was passed in 
response to concerns about so-called crack houses might, years later, block cities 
from establishing safe injection sites. Congress certainly was not thinking about 
safe injection sites when it passed the crack house statute.121 But, like many 
laws enacted at the height of the war on drugs, the crack house statute’s text 
sweeps much more broadly than the problem to which it was addressed.122 And 
 
 113 Sturmoski, 971 F.2d at 462 (quoting 132 CONG. REC. S13,780 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 
1986)). 
 114 See 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1994); see also 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(2012).  
 115 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 101, at S-41 tbl.17, S-104 tbl.33. 
 116 United States v. Tebeau, 713 F.3d 955, 960 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 117 Id. at 961 (quoting 8th Cir. Model Crim. Jury Instr. § 6.21.856B). 
 118 See Kreit, supra note 17, at 432–34 (analyzing application of the crack house statute 
to safe injection site operators based on the prevailing interpretation of the statute’s mens rea 
provisions). 
 119 Bobby Allyn, Supporters Sue to Open Safe Injection Site in Philadelphia, Citing 
Religious Freedom, NPR (Apr. 13, 2019), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/ 
2019/04/13/710253334/supporters-sue-to-open-safe-injection-site-in-philadelphia-
citing-religious-free [https://perma.cc/F6JV-S9JB].  
 120 See Kreit, supra note 17, at 442–62 (arguing that the Controlled Substances Act’s 
immunity provision might apply to shield a state- or local-government-run safe injection site 
from federal interference). 
 121 See United States v. Sturmoski, 971 F.2d 452, 462 (10th Cir. 1992) (discussing the 
legislative history of the crack house statute). 
 122 See 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) (2012); see United States v. Tamez, 941 F.2d 770, 773 
(9th Cir. 1991) (discussing legislative history). 
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so, more than three decades later, the DOJ may be able to employ the law against 
safe injection site operators. If the strategy succeeds, federal prosecutors will 
have blocked safe injection sites without Congress ever considering whether or 
not safe injection sites are good policy or whether this is an issue that should be 
decided at the national or the local level.  
The rise in drug-induced homicide prosecutions paints a similar picture 
about the competing efforts to end or to reinvigorate the war on drugs. Like the 
crack house statute, most drug-induced homicide laws were passed at the height 
of the drug war.123 In fact, the federal drug-induced homicide provision was part 
of the same bill as the crack house statute, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.124 
The federal drug-induced homicide provision was motivated by outcry over the 
cocaine overdose death of star college basketball player Len Bias.125 A number 
of states followed Congress’s lead and most legislators appeared to see these 
laws as targeted at “drug dealers” in general and higher-level drug dealers 
specifically.126 
Although some lawmakers may have imagined the laws would also be 
employed against low-level sellers, there is reason to think many would not have 
realized that friends and spouses who share drugs with one another could be 
subject to drug-induced homicide charges. It is exceedingly rare for people to 
be prosecuted for drug distribution based on social sharing because these kinds 
of exchanges are well hidden from the police. The odds of being caught for 
sharing drugs with someone else in your home or even in public are quite low. 
As a result, at the time the federal drug-induced death statute was passed, a 
number of federal circuit courts had not yet resolved the question of “whether 
the social sharing of a small quantity of drugs, without consideration, constitutes 
the distribution of drugs within the meaning of” the CSA.127  
Until recently, drug-induced homicide prosecutions were also relatively 
rare. But, as discussed above, they have exploded over the past few years, 
mostly because some police and prosecutors have decided to investigate every 
overdose as a homicide.128 Because drug users often share with one another (as 
anyone who has been offered a beer at a friend’s house can attest), a sizeable 
 
 123 See Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 886 (2014) (outlining the legislative 
history of the federal drug-induced homicide laws, including enactment). 
 124 Id. (“[I]n 1986 . . . Congress enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 100 Stat. 3207, which 
redefined the [CSA] offense categories, increased the maximum penalties and set minimum 
penalties for many offenders, including the ‘death results’ enhancement at issue here.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 125 Beletsky, supra note 63, at 869–70 (discussing Len Bias’s death and passage of the 
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number of drug-induced deaths result from the “distribution” of drugs between 
friends and spouses. Outside of drug-induced homicide cases, police typically 
expend no investigative resources targeting friends who share illegal drugs with 
each other. But these kinds of exchanges have increasingly been the focus of 
drug-induced homicide enforcement.129 Conduct that has never been of 
particular concern to law enforcement (the social sharing of drugs) is now 
leading to homicide charges because of the expansive application of rarely used 
drug war-era laws. In this way, prosecutors have been able to single-handedly 
breathe new life into the war on drugs, even as many lawmakers have expressed 
interest in moving toward a public health approach to drug policy.130 
The rise in drug-induced homicide prosecutions also undermines more 
recent, public health-oriented legislation. While drug-induced homicide laws 
may not directly block reform, they work at cross-purposes with the Good 
Samaritan laws that have been passed in forty states.131 Lawmakers have 
embraced Good Samaritan laws in response to increasing evidence that “[t]he 
most common reason people cite for not calling 911 [in response to an overdose] 
is fear of police involvement.”132 In order to encourage people to call 911, Good 
Samaritan laws give limited immunity (most often, immunity from prosecution 
for simple drug possession) to people who call 911 to report an overdose 
death.133 But by increasingly targeting friends and family members for drug-
induced homicide charges, prosecutors are frustrating these laws by deterring 
people from calling for help in response to an overdose “for fear of prosecution 
for manslaughter or murder.”134 Much like the DOJ’s expansive application of 
a dormant drug war-era law has blocked safe injection sites, the expansive 
application of drug-induced homicide laws allows prosecutors to single-
handedly set back current day reform efforts. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The past decade has seen a great deal of enthusiasm for establishing a new, 
public health-oriented approach to drug policy. Barack Obama’s first drug czar, 
Gil Kerlikowske, said upon taking office that it was time to retire the drug war 
strategy.135 This change in rhetoric has coincided with some reforms on the state 
and local level, through the establishment of programs like Law Enforcement 
Assisted Diversion (LEAD) and Good Samaritan laws. It has also led lawmakers 
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in some states to repeal some mandatory minimum drug penalties. Similarly, 
under Attorney General Eric Holder, the Department of Justice placed modest 
limits on the use of federal mandatory minimum drug penalties. But achieving 
significant and lasting reform will require some very heavy lifting. At the federal 
level, Congress will need to dramatically revise federal drug laws, beginning 
with mandatory minimum penalties; a Department of Justice charging policy or 
modest legislative reform is insufficient.136 In the states, programs like LEAD 
will need to be turned into lasting changes to state law, perhaps with a view 
toward even bolder reforms along the lines of Portugal’s decriminalized civil 
drug court system.  
Even as efforts to end the drug war have continued to gain momentum, there 
have been growing calls to revive it. This leaves the country in a pivotal moment 
for drug policy, particularly in the context of the opioid epidemic. It is possible 
to imagine a near future in which safe injection sites are operating in multiple 
cities, Congress has finally enacted meaningful mandatory minimum reforms, 
and one or more states are eyeing decriminalizing drug possession. It is also 
easy to imagine a future in which reform efforts have stalled, the federal 
government has beaten back safe injection sites, and Congress has enacted a 
new set of harsh mandatory minimum drug penalties. Or perhaps the next 
decade of drug policy may include components of each approach. We may see 
a reduction in the criminalization of drug possession and an increase in 
enforcement against drug “sellers” (a group that, of course, also includes many 
users). Or drug policy may become much more decentralized, with some states 
and localities continuing to wage war and others turning to harm reduction 
measures. Whatever the future holds, the battle over safe injection sites and the 
recent increase in drug-induced homicide prosecutions shows that drug war 
supporters currently have the structural upper hand. The height of the drug war 
saw lawmakers pass a dizzying array of broadly worded and increasingly severe 
criminal statutes. Some of these laws were never widely used. But as long as 
they remain in effect, prosecutors can bring these moribund laws back to life to 
frustrate the efforts of those who hope to see an end to the war on drugs. 
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